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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Plaintiff/respondent Bill G. Hendricks, d/b/a/
Deseret Roofing Company (hereinafter "Hendricks") contends
that the issues on appeal are more appropriately formulated
as follows:
1.

Did the trial court properly grant summary

judgment dismissing the counterclaim for damages of
defendant/appellant Interstate Homes, Inc. (hereinafter
"Interstate")?
2.

Was summary judgment on Hendricks1 complaint

improper because an issue of fact remains as to the meaning
of the Rolf Kuepper interoffice memorandum?
3.

Would the existence of Interstate1s counterclaim

preclude summary judgment on the complaint?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The claims relevant to this appeal are those between
Hendricks and Interstate.

Hendricks1 complaint included:

(1) a claim for $19,500 plus interest pursuant to a written
roofing contract with Interstate; and (2) a claim for
$2,852.14 plus interest for supplemental roofing work not
covered by the written contract.

(Record at 3-7)

complaint is attached hereto as Appendix 1.

Hendricks1

Both of

Hendricks1 claims included claims for attorney's fees
pursuant to Utah's Mechanic Lien Statute.

Id.

By a

stipulation entered below, Hendricks1 mechanic's lien was

released, but his statutory right to claim attorney's fees
was preserved.

(Record at 61-62)

Interstate counterclaimed for $50,000 in property
damage allegedly caused by Hendricks1 negligence.
27-32)

(Record at

The Answer and Counterclaim filed by Interstate is

attached hereto as Appendix 2.
On Hendricks1 motion, the trial court entered two
summary judgments.

The first awarded Hendricks $19,500 plus

interest on his claim under the written contract.
166-167)

(Record at

Supplemental to the first judgment, the trial court

awarded costs of $495.74 and attorney's fees of $4,813.80.
(Record at 208-209)

The second judgment entered was a

dismissal of Interstate's counterclaim.

(Record at 180-182)

The two judgments and the award of costs and attorney's fees
are attached hereto as Appendix 3(a), (b) and (c),
respectively.
Both judgments were entered as final judgments under
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, without
objection from Interstate.

Id.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Hendricks is a roofer.

(Record at 2)

Interstate is

a large manufacturer and builder of modular type buildings.
(Deposition of Rolf Kurt Kuepper, dated August 7, 1984
(hereinafter "Kuepper Depo.") at 4)

In April of 1983,

pursuant to a written agreement, Interstate engaged Hendricks
to assist in roofing one of Interstate's projects -- a motel
-2-

building in Price, Utah.

(Kuepper Depo. at 11, Exhibit 1) A

copy of the agreement is attached hereto as Appendix 4.
Under the agreement, Hendricks was to furnish
certain materials, hereinafter referred to as base felt, to
Interstate at its factory.

(Kuepper Depo. at 11-12, 23, 56,

Exhibit 1; Affidavit of Bill G. Hendricks (hereinafter
"Hendricks Affidavit"), 1(4, Record at 106-109)
Affidavit is attached hereto as Appendix 5.

The Hendricks

The agreement

provided that the base felt was to be installed by
Interstate1s personnel in its factory and that Hendricks was
not to be involved in that phase of the installation of the
roof.

(Kuepper Depo. at 12-14, 78; Hendricks Affidavit, 1(4)

The agreement further provided that Hendricks was to complete
the roof on the motel once the modular sections of the motel
had been assembled in Price, Utah.
Hendricks Affidavit)

(Kuepper Depo. at 10-11;

Finally, the agreement provided that

Hendricks was to be paid $19,500 and the terms were "cash
upon completion".

(Appendix 4; Kuepper Depo. at 12;

Hendricks Affidavit, 113)
Hendricks ordered the base felt materials through
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation (hereinafter
"Owens-Corning"), and the materials were billed to Hendricks
but shipped directly from Owens-Corning to Interstate.
(Kuepper Depo. at 25, 27, Exhibit 3; Hendricks Affidavit,
K5)

Interstate initially received approximately 60 rolls of

base felt material.

These rolls had a paper strap around
-3-

them which clearly identified the material as "Type 28
Bondable Base".

(Kuepper Depo. at 31, Exhibit 5)

A copy of

this paper strap is attached hereto as Appendix 6.

This

material proved insufficient to cover the modular sections of
the motel, so Interstate requested Hendricks to supply an
additional eighteen (18) rolls.

(Kuepper Depo. at 25-2(5)

As requested, Hendricks ordered eighteen (18) rolls
of base felt from Owens-Corning.

(Kuepper Depo. at 26;

Hendricks Affidavit, 1(7) An invoice reflecting the
additional eighteen rolls was received by Hendricks and
Interstate.

The invoice reflected that the proper base felt

material had been shipped by Owens-Corning directly to
Interstate.

(Kuepper Depo. at 26, 27, Exhibit 3)

the invoice is attached hereto as Appendix 7.

A copy of

The material

actually shipped, however, was not the material shown on the
invoice, but was an intermediate felt known as "Type IV
Ultra-Ply".

(Kuepper Depo. at 27, 29-34, 37, 90, Exhibit 3;

Hendricks Affidavit, 19)
The Ultra-Ply felt is porous and is lighter than the
base felt.

When the materials are compared, side by side,

one can readily feel the difference in the material, and if
they are held up to the light, one can see a difference in
the material.

(Kuepper Depo. at 65-67)

When the eighteen rolls of the Ultra-Ply arrived at
Interstate1s factory from Owens-Corning, each roll had a
paper strap around it clearly identifying each roll as
-4-

containing Type IV Ultra-Ply.

(Kuepper Depo. at 28-34,

Exhibit 4) A copy of this paper strap is attached hereto as
Appendix 8.

Interstate1s employees failed to recognize that

the second delivery contained intermediate felt as opposed to
base felt.

(Kuepper Depo. at 31-32)

Hendricks had no notice

or knowledge that the wrong material had been shipped to and
used by Interstate.

(Hendricks Affidavit, 1110)

Interstate

covered certain modular sections of the motel with Ultra-Ply
intermediate felt and then transported the modules to the
property site in Price, Utah.

(Kuepper Depo. at 23, 26)

On June 8, 1983, just two or three days after the
modules were set in place, there was a rainstorm in Price,
Utah.

The modules covered with the intermediate felt

sustained water damage to the interiors of the units.
(Kuepper Depo. at 24, 60, 92)
base felt was applied.

There was no damage where the

(Kuepper Depo. at 24, 34, 37, 90, 92)

Hendricks informed Interstate that while he did not
believe he was responsible for the water damage, he would
submit a claim to his liability insurance carrier for the
damage to the motel.

(Kuepper Depo. at 45-46, 70, 71-72;

Hendricks Affidavit, Kll)

In return for submitting the

insurance claim, Hendricks demanded assurance from Interstate
that he would be paid in full upon completion of the roof as
required by the contract.
Affidavit, 1112)

(Kuepper Depo. at 46-47; Hendricks

In response to that request, Rolf Kuepper

prepared an interoffice memorandum on behalf of Interstate, a
-5-

copy of which was sent to Hendricks.

(Kuepper Depo. at

46-47; Hendricks Affidavit, 1113) That memorandum
(hereinafter the "Kuepper Memorandumff) states in part
"payment on this job will not be affected by insurance claim
in progress".

(Kuepper Depo. at 47, 53-55, Exhibit 7;

Hendricks Affidavit, 1113) The "insurance claim" is the
damage claim which is the subject of the counterclaim in the
present action.

(Kuepper Depo. at 54)

A copy of the Kuepper

Memorandum is attached hereto as Appendix 9.
In reliance upon the Kuepper Memorandum, Hendricks
completed the roof in a manner satisfactory to Interstate.
(Kuepper Depo. at 49, 94; Deposition of Walter Wood, dated
August 7, 1984, at 3; Hendricks Affidavit, 1114) Upon
completion of the roof, Hendricks sent an invoice to
Interstate for $19,500.

(Hendricks Affidavit, 1(15)

Interstate has refused to pay that invoice because Hendricks'
insurance carrier has refused to pay the damage claim.
(Kuepper Depo. at 52)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Summary judgment was proper on the counterclaim
because Hendricks breached no duty towards Interstate, was
not negligent in any respect, and did not cause Interstate to
sustain any damage.

Since summary judgment was proper on the

counterclaim, it was necessarily proper on the complaint.
addition, summary judgment on the complaint was proper
because it is undisputed that Hendricks satisfactorily
-6-

In

completed the work called for in his contract, and that
Interstate specifically agreed that Hendricks was entitled to
payment immediately upon completion of his work, regardless
of the damage claim that is the subject of the counterclaim.
In any event, the existence of the counterclaim would not bar
summary judgment on the complaint.
ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
Under the rules of appellate review, the Court must
affirm the lower court's granting of summary judgment if it
can do so on any proper ground.

Allphin Realty, Inc. v.

Sine, 595 P.2d 860 (Utah 1979).

S£e also

Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267 (Utah
1982).

Thus, Interstate has the burden of showing on appeal

that no correct finding would sustain the decision of the
lower court.

In this case, several grounds exist to support

the lower court's granting of summary judgment.
The dispute in this case centers on the property
damage to the building Hendricks was to roof for Interstate.
Interstate's counterclaim alleges this damage was caused by
Hendricks' negligence.

As set forth below, the lower court

properly granted summary judgment dismissing this
counterclaim because Hendricks breached no duty toward
Interstate and did not cause the property damage.
Interstate also contends that the existence of its
counterclaim bars summary judgment on Hendricks' complaint
-7-

for money due under the roofing contract.

Since the

existence of Interstate1s counterclaim is the only matter
raised in opposition to summary judgment on the complaint, it
necessarily follows that, if the court affirms summary
judgment on the counterclaim, summary judgment was also
proper as to the complaint.

Accordingly, this brief will

first discuss why summary judgment was proper on the
counterclaim.

It will then show that summary judgment would

be proper on the complaint, even if it were not proper on the
counterclaim.
POINT I
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER ON THE COUNTERCLAIM
The counterclaim of Interstate asserts a
negligence claim against Hendricks.

However, the record

is devoid of any supporting facts.
Hendricks did not have any duty or responsibility
whatsoever regarding the constructon of the modular units in
Interstate1s plant.

Once the modular units were delivered to

Price, Utah, Hendricks did have a job of completing the
roofing on the units.

However, he did this in a

non-negligent, non-careless, satisfactory manner.

No one is

making any claim to the contrary.
The only other possible theory of recovery against
Hendricks is that he negligently supplied the wrong roofing
materials (Type IV Ultra-Ply) to Interstate rather than Type
28 Bondable Base Felt, and that this Ultra-Ply material
-8-

failed and as a result water damaged two sections of the
motel.

There is no claim that the rolls of Ultra-Ply roofing

were defective —

only that they should not have been used or

applied as they were.
As testified to by Interstate's own representative,
Rolf Kuepper, Hendricks and Kuepper jointly agreed that base
felt would be used to cover the modular sections of the motel
and that this material would be ordered through
Owens-Corning.

Sixty rolls of base felt were ordered,

shipped directly to Interstate1s plant and applied to the
modular sections of the model by Interstate1s personnel.
When the 60 rolls of base felt were used, additional
work still needed to be done.

Therefore, Hendricks ordered

an additional 18 rolls of base felt from Owens-Corning.
Shortly thereafter, Hendricks' company, Deseret Roofing
Company, received an invoice stating that 18 rolls of base
felt had been sent directly by Owens-Corning to Interstate.
As noted, a copy of the invoice is attached hereto as
Appendix 7.
In actuality, base felt was not sent by
Owens-Corning to Interstate.

Instead, Owens-Corning,

contrary to its invoice, sent 18 rolls of Type IV Ultra-Ply
roofing material.

This was clearly not the material

Hendricks had ordered.

By reviewing the Owens-Corning

invoice, Hendricks could not possibly have detected that the
wrong materials were sent to Interstate.
-9-

Despite the fact that the Ultra-Ply roofing
materials were lighter and more porous than the base felt,
and despite the fact that each roll of Ultra-Ply was clearly
labeled "Type IV Ultra-Ply", as opposed to Type 28 Bondable
Base, no one in Interstatefs plant detected the fact that the
second 18 rolls of roofing materials were not the same as the
first 60 rolls had been.

Therefore, Interstate1s workers

unrolled the Ultra-Ply and nailed it to the remaining
unfinished roof areas of the modular units.
After construction was completed in Interstate1s
plant, the modular units were shipped to the job site in
Price, Utah.

Within a matter of two or three days after the

units were set in place, rain fell and water damaged only
those units where Ultra-Ply material was utilized.
The facts are simple, straight-forward, clear, and
undisputed.

Hendricks did nothing amiss and was not careless

or negligent in any way.

Summary judgment is a proper method

for eliminating negligence cases which have no merit.
Preston v. Lamb, 20 Utah 2d 260, 436 P.2d 1021 (1968).
Unquestionably, the summary judgment which was granted to
Hendricks in the lower court on the counterclaim which
Interstate filed was proper.
On appeal, Interstate seeks to transform its
negligence counterclaim into a counterclaim sounding in
contract.

However, at no time in the trial court did

Interstate ask to amend its pleadings to assert a claim for
-10-

breach of contract.
tort.
appeal.

Indeed, Interstate1s claim sounds in

Interstate cannot change its theory of the case on
Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267

(Utah 1982); First Equity Corp. of Florida v. Utah State
University, 544 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975); Davis v.
Mulholland, 25 Utah 2d 56, 475 P.2d 834 (1970).
It is undisputed that a contract existed between
Interstate and Hendricks.

As discussed, however, the

counterclaim brought by Interstate was presented on a theory
of negligence and no contract claims were made. However,
even if the counterclaim was construed to be in contract, the
result is precisely the same.

Summary judgment was proper.

The contract between Interstate and Hendricks must
be viewed as a two-part contract, one part being for the sale
of goods and the other part as a construction contract.

The

contract provided that Hendricks would furnish felt and nails
in an amount normally used for the area involved and that
this base felt would be nailed in place by Interstate.
Hendricks was then required to furnish and install shingles
once the motel units were assembled in Price, Utah.
Interstate has made no contention that the installation of
shingles was improperly performed or that it suffered any
damages as a result thereof.
As to the sale portion of the contract, there is no
evidence to indicate that Interstate rejected the goods.
fact, the installation of the goods on the units being
-11-
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constructed by Interstate constituted acceptance of the goods
in conformity with S 70A-2-606, Utah Code Annotated.

The

measure of damages for breach of contract in regard to
accepted goods is generally the difference between the value
of the goods accepted and the value they would have had if
they had been as warranted.

Section 70A-2-714(2), Utah Code

Annotated.
In this case, there is no evidence suggesting that
the charges to Interstate for Ultra-Ply would not be
identical to the charges for the base felt. Therefore,
Interstate sustained no damages since its remedy simply would
have been to exchange 18 rolls of Ultra-Ply material for 18
rolls of base felt.
The kinds of consequential damages which Interstate
seeks to recover here can only be recovered under a breach of
warranty theory.

Breach of warranty was never alleged as a

cause of action in Interstate1s counterclaim and cannot,
therefore, be argued here.

In any event, in a breach of

warranty action, misuse is an absolute defense.

Ernest

W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah
1979); Melby v. Hawkins Pontiac, Inc., 13 Wash. App. 745,
537 P.2d 807 (1975); Chisholm v. J. R. Simplot Co., 94
Idaho 628, 495 P.2d 1113 (1972).
undisputed as to misuse.

Here, the evidence is

The wrong material (Ultra-Ply) was

sent by Owens-Corning to Interstate.

This Ultra-Ply should

not have been used to cover plywood or to serve the function
-12-

of the base felt.

Nevertheless, employees of Interstate used

the Ultra-Ply material as if it were base felt.

Water damage

resulted from the misuse of Ultra-Ply material by Interstate.
In any claim for damages, be it founded on tort or
contract, a causal relationship must be shown between the
conduct of one party and the damages of another.

As a matter

of law, it has not and cannot be shown that any actions of
Hendricks proximately caused Interstate to sustain damage.
What is readily apparent from the record is that damages
sustained by Interstate were caused by Interstate itself.
The undisputed evidence indicated that Interstate installed
the felt without notifying Hendricks that the felt had been
delivered.

Interstate did not request Hendricks to inspect

the felt and, in fact, did not give Hendricks an opportunity
to do so.

Interstate simply has not and cannot point to any

breach of duty, contractual or otherwise, on the part of
Hendricks which proximately caused any damage to Interstate.
In a factually similar case, the Oklahoma Appellate
Court denied recovery to a buyer for damages caused by
defective glue.

In the case of Davis v. Pumpco, Inc.,

519 P.2d 557 (Okla. App. 1974), plaintiffs were developing a
mobile home development which required laying approximately
5,600 feet of water pipe across plaintiffs' land.

Plaintiffs

contacted the defendants and purchased from them pipe and
cement necessary for construction of the water pipe.
Although the shipping order stated that the proper glue had
-13-

been shipped, the glue actually sent to the plaintiffs was
for sewer pipe use only.

Nevertheless, plaintiffs1

contractor used the wrong glue and damage resulted.

The

Appellate Court focused on the problem, saying:
Therefore, we think the critical issue here
becomes: Is there in the record evidence from which
the trial court could find that the buyer before
using the goods examined them and found or should
have found them clearly to be unfit or obviously
inappropriate for the particular purpose, and Lf so,
did he fail to notify the seller, so that the
warranty of fitness thereafter ceased to exist?
In answering this question, the Appellate Court affirmed the
trial court's judgment of dismissal.
In the present case, it is undisputed that the paper
strap around each roll of felt clearly identified the
product.

The straps around the first 60 rolls identified

them as Type 28 Bondable Base.

The straps around the

additional 18 rolls were clearly marked Type IV Ultra-Ply.
Upon examination of the goods, it would have been readily
apparent that the last 18 rolls were not Bondable Base and
should not have been used as they were by Interstate.
To summarize, Hendricks was not negligent, no
contractual claim has been properly made against him and even
assuming a claim based on contract were properly asserted by
Interstate, such a claim would fail because Hendricks did not
cause Interstate to suffer any damage.

-14-

POINT II
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER ON THE COMPLAINT
A.

No Issue of Fact Exists as to the Meaning of the
Kuepper Memorandum.
It is not disputed in this case that Hendricks

contracted with Interstate to perform a roofing contract, and
in return, Interstate agreed to pay Hendricks $19,500 upon
completion.

Nor is it disputed that Hendricks satisfactorily

completed the contract.
It is similarly undisputed that, although Hendricks
denied responsibility for the damage claim, he agreed to
submit the claim to his insurance company in exchange for the
Kuepper Memorandum, a written confirmation of the parties1
agreement as to payment upon completion of the roofing work.
Hendricks relied upon that Memorandum in completing the
roof.

However, Interstate refused to pay Hendricks upon

completion because the insurance company refused to pay the
damage claim.

Interstate now attempts to avoid the Kuepper

Memorandum by claiming an issue of fact exists as to its
meaning.
1.

Under the Parol Evidence Rule, Testimony
Purporting to Contradict the Plain Meaning
of the Memorandum Would be Inadmissible.

The Kuepper Memorandum stated in relevant part:
payment on this job will not be affected by insurance
claim in progress."

See Appendix 9.

-15-

(emphasis added).

"...

Interstate claims the deposition testimony and
affidavit of Rolf Kuepper raises an issue of fact as to the
meaning of the Kuepper Memorandum,

In his deposition,

Kuepper admits to having authored the Memorandum, but he
attempts to escape the plain meaning of his words in
testifying that it was his "understanding" that the insurance
company would "take care of" the damage claim.
Depo. at 47)

(Kuepper

Based upon this "understanding", Interstate now

contends that Hendricks is no longer entitled to payment upon
completion because the insurance company refused to pay the
damage claim.

In other words, Interstate would now interpret

the Kuepper Memorandum to mean "payment on the job will
be affected by the damage claim".
Thus, Kuepper's understanding (as offered by
Interstate) is directly contrary to the unmistakable language
of the Memorandum.

Either the insurance claim does not

affect payment on the job, as the writing states, or it does,
as Interstate would interpret Kuepper1s oral testimony.
Clearly such testimony is not compatible with the writing.
It is equally clear that such testimony is barred by the
parol evidence rule.

See Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665

P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983); Bushnell Real Estate, Inc.
v. Nielson, 672 P.2d 746, 750 (Utah 1983); E. A.
Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. Broderick, 522 P.2d
144, 145-146 (Utah 1974).
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Interstate attempts to side-step the rule by arguing
that the Kuepper Memorandum did not embody the entire
contract, i.e., it was not integrated.

However, whether the

Memorandum is an integration is immaterial because the
extrinsic evidence offered here would contradict the terms of
the writing.

If the writing is not

the complete contract, parol evidence not
inconsistent with the writing is admissible to
show what the entire contract really was, by
supplementing, as distinguished from
contradicting, the writing. In such a case
parol evidence to prove the part not reduced to
writing is admissible, although it is not
admissible as to the part reduced to writing.
Stanger v. Sentinel Security Life Insurance Co., 669 P.2d
1201, 1205 (Utah 1983).

(emphasis added).

In other words,

extrinsic evidence may be allowed to supplement an ambiguous
or incomplete written term, but it will not be allowed to
contradict a written term already clear in its meaning.
Furthermore, where the subject at issue (the effect
of the insurance claim on Interstate1s obligation to make
payment) is "mentioned, covered, or dealt with in the
writing," the trial court should refuse to admit extrinsic
evidence "in contradiction" to it. Alexander v. Brown,
646 P.2d 692, 694 (Utah 1982).
Interstate1s reliance on Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v.
Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 501 P.2d 266 (1971) is misplaced.
The issue in Bullfrog was whether a separate written
employment agreement was in fact interrelated with a written
-17-

lease.

501 P.2d at 269.

Defendant claimed that plaintiff's

alleged breach of the employment contract allowed him to
terminate the lease.

This Court stated that whether the

lease was integrated, i.e., "final and complete" in itself,
or whether it must be interpreted in light of the employment
contract, was a question of fact.

I_d* at 270.

The fact question in Bullfrog in no way
authorizes the admission of parol evidence which directly
contradicts the express terms of the recognized writing.
Hendricks does not contend that the Kuepper Memorandum
embodied the complete contract between the parties.
However, there is no dispute that it was part of the
contract.

Thus, under the law established by this Court,

Rolf Kuepperfs testimony that the plain language of the
Memorandum did not accord with his "understanding" is
inadmissible.
In short, Interstate is not offering to clarify an
ambiguity, supply an omission or supplement the contract with
a consistent additional term.
supra, 665 P.2d at 1293.

See Farnsworth,

Its approach is quite simple.

Through oral testimony of one person's alleged understanding,
it would interpret the words "not be affected by" to mean "be
affected by."

George Orwell notwithstanding, this evidence

is barred by the parol evidence rule.
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2.

Regardless of the Parol Evidence Rule,
Rolf KuepperTs Undisclosed Intentions or
Understanding Alone Could Not Alter or
Modify the Agreement?

Even if the parol evidence rule would not bar Rolf
Kuepperfs extrinsic testimony, that testimony fails to raise
an issue of fact as to the meaning or effect of the Kuepper
Memorandum.

When questioned if the Memorandum meant that

Hendricks was entitled to payment upon completion regardless
of the insurance company's disposition of the damage claim,
Kuepper admits:

"That is what the memo seems to indicate.

That is not what I meant to say, but that is what it
indicates."

(Kuepper Depo. at 55)

Kuepper attempts to

qualify the Memorandum by stating that:

"my understanding in

reality was that payment on the job would not be held up
pending the settlement of the claim but that the insurance
company would take care of the claim".
47)

(Kuepper Depo. at

A similar statement is found in Rolf Kuepper's

Affidavit.

(Kuepper Affidavit, 1(13) Apparently, Interstate

now claims that payment of the insurance claim somehow became
a condition to its obligation to pay upon completion.
However, nowhere in the record is there any indication that
such a condition became part of the agreement between
Interstate and Hendricks.

Indeed, there is no indication

that Kuepper1s "understanding" was even communicated to
Hendricks.
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It is well established that unexpressed intentions
do not affect a contract.

Jarmillo v. Farmers

Insurance Group, 669 P.2d 1231, 1233 (Utah 1983).

The

apparent mutual assent of the parties to a contract must be
gathered by the language or acts employed by them, and the
law imputes to a person an intention corresponding to the
reasonable meaning of his words and acts.

Allen v.

Bissinger & Co., 62 Utah 226, 231, 219 P. 539, 541
(1923).

Corbin aptly observes that a party's contractual

intentions must be determined from his objective behavior,
not from his internal thought processes:
Agreement consists of mutual expressions; it does
not consist of harmonious intentions or state of
mind. It may well be that intentions and states of
mind are themselves nothing but chemical reactions
or electrical discharges in some part of the nervous
system. It may be that some day we may be able to
observe a state of mind in the same way that we
observe chemical processes and electrical
discharges. At present, however, what we observe
for judicial purposes is the conduct of the
parties. We observe this conduct and we describe it
as the expression of a state of mind.
A. Corbin, A Comprehensive Treatise on the Working Rules
of Contract Law S 9 (1963).
In the present case, there can be no doubt as to the
reasonable meaning of the words used in the Kuepper
Memorandum.

Rolf Kuepperfs understanding that the insurance

claim would be "taken care of" was nothing more than an
understanding.

It could not, without more, create an
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agreement different from that expressed in the Kuepper
Memorandum.
B.

The Existence of the Counterclaim Would Not Bar
Summary Judgment on the Complaint.
If the Court finds that an issue of fact does exist

as to whether Interstate specifically agreed that the damage
claim would not affect Hendricks1 right to payment upon
completion of the contract, it must then decide whether the
existence of the damage claim as a counterclaim bars summary
judgment on the complaint.

As will be shown below, an

unresolved counterclaim does not bar summary judgment on the
complaint where the facts pertaining to the complaint are
undisputed.

Since there is no dispute in the present case

that Hendricks satisfactorily completed his contract, he is
entitled to summary judgment on his contract claim regardless
of the existence of the counterclaim.
Interstate cites certain general authorities (Am.
Jur. and A.L.R.) and a federal case decided in 1946
(Parmelee v. Chicago Eye Shield Co., 157 F.2d 582 (8th
Cir. 1946)) for the proposition that a non-frivolous
counterclaim in excess of the primary claim bars summary
judgment on the primary claim.

Interstate also relies upon

Bennion v. Amoss, 28 Utah 2d 216, 500 P.2d 512 (1972).
However, contrary to Interstate1s position, that case states
that Rule 56 "permits partial adjudications of issues and
claims" and therefore summary judgment on a complaint is
-21-

not precluded by the existence of the counterclaim.
P.2d at 516.

500

It is true that Bennion refers to Annot., 8

A.L.R.3d 1361. That annotation recites a two-part "general
rule" which holds that (1) while a frivolous counterclaim is
no bar to summary judgment, (2) a "good and substantial"
counterclaim may bar summary judgment, or may allow the court
to refuse execution of the judgment while the counterclaim
remains pending.

8 A.L.R.3d at 1365, 1370. As will be shown

below, the portion of the above rule that would preclude
summary judgment on an undisputed claim merely because a
counterclaim exists is inapplicable under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, and under state rules (such as Utah's)
patterned thereafter.

In any event, Bennion did not hold

that a "good and substantial" counterclaim bars summary
judgment on the complaint.

It merely cited the annotation

for the proposition that a frivolous counterclaim would not
bar summary judgment.
The modern view is reflected in cases decided under
the present version of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
These authorities hold that pendency of an unresolved
counterclaim, even if it exceeds the primary claim, or
involves the same transaction as the primary claim, or could
be advanced as a set-off or a recoupment against the primary
claim, does not render inappropriate summary judgment on the
primary claim.

See e.g., Chemetron Corp. v.

Cervantes, 92 F.R.D. 26, (D. P.R. 1981);
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Electroglas, Inc. v. Dynatex Corp., 473 F.Supp. 1167
(N.D. Cal. 1979); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Tishman Realty
& Construction Co., 72 F.R.D. 33 (S.D. N.Y. 1976);
Schroeter v. Ralph Wilson Plastics, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 323
(S.D. N.Y. 1969).
A thorough discussion of the issue, as well as a
collection of the cases, is contained at 6 Moore's Federal
Practice, 11 56.17(15), pp. 56-810 -813, and 1984-85 Cum.
Supp. pp. 54-55.

According to Moore's, under former versions

of the Federal Rules there was some confusion as to when
judgment could be entered upon a claim without also disposing
of a counterclaim.

_Id. at 56-811 -812. Thus, some old

cases, such as the Parmelee case relied upon by
Interstate, held that a non-frivolous counterclaim would bar
summary judgment on the complaint.
Moore's points out that under the modern version of
the Federal Rules, including Rules 54(b), 56 and 62(h),
summary judgment is appropriate as to any claim that does
not involve a disputed factual issue. Moore's, supra, at
56-812, 56-1221 -1222.

After summary judgment is granted,

the trial court may then determine, in its discretion,
whether final judgment should be entered under Rule 54(b), or
whether enforcement of the judgment should be stayed under
Rule 62(h).

Id.

Since Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 54(b), 56 and
62(h) are for purposes here identical to their Federal
-23-

counterparts, the above principles should govern this case.
There is no dispute here that plaintiff provided a
satisfactory roof and is entitled to the contract balance of
$19,500.

Accordingly, the trial court was correct in

granting summary judgment on that claim, and Interstate's
contention that the mere existence of its counterclaim would
preclude summary judgment on the complaint is simply without
merit.
POINT III
HENDRICKS IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES IN DEFENDING
THIS APPEAL AS TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE COMPLAINT
As noted above, this litigation commenced as a
complaint by Hendricks to foreclose a mechanic's lien against
the motel property in question.

By stipulation, the

mechanic's lien was released, but Hendricks' statutory right
to claim attorney's fees in connection with this action was
preserved.

(Record at 61-62)

This Court has held on several occasions that
attorney's fees may be awarded on appeal when authorized by
statute, or when agreed to by the parties.

Rosenlof v..

Sullivan, 676 P.2d 372 (Utah 1983); Management
Services Corp. v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406
(Utah 1980); Nielsen v. Chin-Hsien Wang, 613 P.2d 512
(Utah 1980).

Ordinarily, the Court remands to the lower

court for determination as to the amount of fees to be
awarded.

Id.
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In the present case, Utah's Mechanic's Lien Statute,
Utah Code Ann, S 38-1-18, as well as the stipulation
entered below, provide for attorney's fees to Hendricks for
the successful prosecution of his complaint.

Accordingly,

Hendricks requests the Court to authorize an award of a
reasonable attorney's fee for defending this appeal as to
summary judgment on the complaint.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Hendricks is not
liable for the damage claim as a matter of law; therefore,
summary judgment on the counterclaim was proper.

For that

reason alone, the Court must also affirm summary judgment on
the complaint.

However, the Court may also affirm on the

complaint for the separate reasons that (1) no material issue
of fact exists as to the meaning of the Kuepper Memorandum
which confirmed that payment upon completion would be
unaffected by the damage claim, and (2) in any event, the
existence of the damage claim as a counterclaim would not
preclude summary judgment on the complaint.

Thus, the lower

court's ruling should be affirmed in all respects.
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DATED this 2-^> &

day of May, 1985.
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
a Professional Corporation

By LP.dxA£L^J&£&.
W. Cullen Battle
STRONG & HANNI

Robert^A. HUrton
Attorneys for Respondent
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800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 531-8900
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BILL G. HENDRICKS, d/b/a DESERET
ROOFING COMPANY,

CC

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
v.
INTERSTATE HOMES, INC., FRANZ C.
STANGL III, ELIZABETH ANN STANGL,
NEBRASKA SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATION, F.A., EMPIRE LAND
TITLE, INC., a Utah corporation,
and JOHN DOES I - XX,
Defendants.

Plaintiff Bill G. Hendricks, d/b/a Deseret Roofing
Company (hereinafter "Hendricks"), complains of defendants as
follows:
I.
1.

JURISDICTION AND PARTIES

Hendricks is a resident of Davis County, Utah and

does business as Deseret Roofing Company in Salt Lake County, Utah,
2.

Defendants Franz C. Stangl III and Elizabeth Ann

Stangl are the owners of the real property, together with
improvements, located in Carbon County, Utah, described in Exhibit
"A" hereto (hereinafter the "Property").
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3.

Defendant Interstate Homes, Inc. (hereinafter

"Interstate Homes") is a Utah corporation doing a contracting
business in the State of Utah.
4.

Defendant Nebraska Savings and Loan Association is a

Nebraska corporation not registered to do business in Utah.
5.

Defendant Empire Land Title, Inc. is a Utah

corporation having its principal place of business in Utah County,
Utah.
6.

The identities of John Does I-XX have not yet been

ascertained but will be supplied when the same become known to
plaintiff.
7.

This is an action affecting real property located in

Carbon County, Utah.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
8.

Plaintiff realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1

through 7 above by this reference.
9.

Interstate Homes was the general contractor employed

by Franz C. Stangl III to build and construct a motel building
upon the Property.
10.

On or about April 13, 1983, Hendricks and Interstate

Homes entered into an agreement whereby Hendricks agreed to
furnish certain labor and materials necessary to roof the motel
building located on the Property, and Interstate Homes agreed to
pay Hendricks the sum of $19,500, together with interest thereon
at 2% per month from the date of invoice upon completion of the
work.
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11.

On or about June 14f 1983, said written contract was

orally supplemented by the parties, pursuant to which Hendricks
agreed to perform certain additional work towards the roofing of
the motel building and Interstate Homes agreed to pay the
reasonable value therefor.

The written contract, together with

the supplemental terms added thereto, shall hereinafter be
referred to as "the Contract".
12.

Pursuant to the Contract, Hendricks furnished said

labor and materials as agreed between June 16, 1983 and June 25,
1983 and has done everything else required of him by the
Contract.
13.

The reasonable value of the supplemental work

performed by Hendricks was $2,852.14.

On June 27, 1983, Hendricks

mailed to Interstate Homes invoices totalling $22,352.44 for labor
and materials provided pursuant to the Contract.
14.

By reason of the foregoing Interstate Homes is

indebted to Hendricks in the amount of $22,352.44 with interest
thereon at 2% per month from June 27, 1983 until paid.

Interstate

Homes has failed and refused to pay this amount, notwithstanding
Hendricks1 numerous demands therefor.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
15.

Plaintiff realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1

through 14 above by this reference.
16.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-1 et seq.,

Hendricks is entitled to a mechanics lien encumbering the Property
to secure the amounts owing to him as alleged above, which lien
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relates back, takes effect and has priority as of the date of
first work on the Property.

The date of the priority of

Hendricks 1 lien is not later than May 15 f 1983.
17.

On September 13, 1983, Hendricks caused to be

recorded in the office of the Carbon County Recorder a Notice of
Lien encumbering the Property.

Said Notice of Lien was recorded

as Entry No. 000847 in Book B-31, paqes 800-801.

A copy of said

notice is attached hereto as Exhibit "B."
18.

Hendricks is entitled to have his mechanic's lien

foreclosed to secure payment in the sum of $22,352.14, together
with interest thereon at the rate of 2% per month from June 27,
1983 until paid, Hendricks' court costs in this action, and a
reasonable attorneys 1

fee.

19.

Defendant Nebraska Savings and Loan Association

(hereinafter

"N.S.L.A.") or defendant Empire Land Title, Inc.

(hereinafter

"Empire") claim or may claim to have a lien upon, or

an interest in the Property by reason of the following:
(a)

A deed of trust, dated May 20, 1983, to secure

indebtedness in the amount of $1,500,000.00, and recorded June
3, 1983, in Book 228, page 681-684, entry no. 168793, of the
official records of the Carbon County Recorder, under which
Franz C. Stangl III and Elizabeth Ann Stangl are named
trustors, Empire is named Trustee, and
Mortgage Corp. is named
(b)

Richards-Woodbury

Beneficiary.

An assignment dated May 20, 1983, and recorded

June 3, 1983, in book 228, page 685-686, entry no. 168794, of
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the official records of the Carbon County Recorder, wherein
the beneficial interest in the above-described deed of trust
was assigned to N.S.L.A.
20.

Such interest or lien of N.S.L.A. or Empire is

inferior, junior, subordinate to, or invalid as against the
mechanics lien of Hendricks.
21.

Defendants John Does I-XX

each claim or may claim

to have a lien upon or an interest in the subject premises, but
each such interest or lien, if any, is inferior, junior,
subordinate to, or invalid as against the mechanic's lien of
Hendricks.
22.

A Notice of Lis Pendens giving notice of this action

has been filed with the office of the Carbon County Recorder, a
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "C."
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
23.

Plaintiff realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1

through 22 above by this reference.
24.

Defendants Franz C. Stangl III and Elizabeth Ann

Stangl failed to obtain a bond as required by Utah Code Ann.
§ 14-2-1 and, by virtue of Utah Code Ann. §§ 14-2-2 and 14-2-3,
said defendants are liable to Hendricks for the sum of $22,352.14,
together with interest thereon at 2% per month from June 27, 1983
until paid, Hendricks1 court costs in this action, and a
reasonable attorneys1 fee.
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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
25.

Plaintiff realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1

through 24 above by this reference.
26.

The provisions of the Contract, as well as Utah Code

Ann. § 38-1-18 (1953), provide for court costs, attorneys' fees
and other costs of collection to be awarded to Hendircks in this
action.

Hendricks has been required to employ the law firm of

Fabian & Clendenin to commence this action and is entitled to
reasonable attorneys' fees as may be determined by the Court as
well as all other costs and expenses in bringing this action and
collecting the amounts owed to him.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Bill G. Hendricks, d/b/a Deseret
Roofing Company prays for a judgment under the First, Second,
Third and Fourth Causes of Action as follows:
1.

Against defendants Interstate Homes, Franz C. Stangl

III and Elizabeth Ann Stangl for $22,352.14, together with
interest thereon at 2% per month from June 27, 1983 until paid,
for a reasonable attorneys' fees for costs of court and for other
costs of collection in this action.
2.

For an Order of the Court determining that Hendricks

holds a valid mechanic's lien on the Property, and determining
that all other liens and interests held or claimed by defendants
are inferior, junior or subordinate to, or invalid as against the
mechanic's lien of Hendricks.
3.

For an Order of the Court foreclosing Hendricks'

mechanic's lien on the Property and ordering the Property be sold
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at a public sale, as provided by law, for the satisfactions of
such sums as are determined to be owing to Hendricks.
4.

For court costs, reasonable attorneys1 fees and other

costs of collection incurred in this action.
5.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems

just.
DATED this ~23 ^day of January, 1984.
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Plaintiff

By

Ckx^A.

W. Cullen B a t t l e

Plaintiff's Address;
3957 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND CARBON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

BILL G. HENDRICKS, d/b/a
DESERET ROOFING COMPANY,
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM
OF DEFENDANT INTERSTATE
HOMES, INC.

Plaintiff,

vs.
INTERSTATE HOMES, INC., et al,
Civil No. 14090

Defendants.

Defendant Interstate Homes, Inc., answers the
plaintiff's Complaint as follows:
I
The Complaint fails to state a cause of action upon
which relief can be granted.
II
The plaintiff is estopped from recovering any alleged
damages on the grounds that the plaintiff's failure to roof the
buildings in accordance with the plans and specifications was the
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direct and proximate cause of damages suffered by the defendants
in the amount of approximately $50,000*
III
Plaintiff is barred from recovery because of his own
contributory negligence.

In particular, plaintiff failed to

provide materials that would make the roof "weather tite". The
materials provided at the instance of the plaintiff did not prevent leaking during inclement weather, directly causing severe
water damage to the building roofed by plaintiff.
IV
This defendant further answers:
1.

Admits the allegations contained in paragraph 1.

2.

Admits the allegations contained in paragraph 2.

3.

Admits the allegations contained in paragraph 3.

4.

This defendant at this time does not have suf-

ficient information upon which to admit or deny the allegations
contained in paragraph 4*
5.

Admits the allegations contained in paragraph 5.

6.

Admits the allegations contained in paragraph 6.

7.

Admits the allegations contained in paragraph 7.

8.

Admits and denies the allegations contained in

paragraph 8, consistent with answers 1 through 7.
9.

Admits the allegations contained in paragraph 9.

10.

Admits plaintiff and defendant entered into a writ-
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ten agreement under the terms of which plaintiff was to provide
labor and materials for a roof for the sum of $19,500.

However,

it was further agreed that payment was conditioned on said roof
being "weather tite".
11.

Denies the allegations contained in paragraph 11.

12.

Denies the allegations contained in paragraph 12.

13.

Denies the allegations contained in paragraph 13.

14.

Denies the allegations contained in paragraph 14.

15.

Denies the allegations contained in paragraph 15.

16.

Denies the allegations contained in paragraph 16.

17.

Admits the allegations contained in paragraph 17.

18.

Denies the allegations contained in paragraph 18.

19.

Admits the allegations contained in paragraph 19.

20.

Denies the allegations contained in paragraph 20.

21.

Denies the allegations contained in paragraph 21.

22.

Admits the allegations contained in paragraph 22.

23.

Admits and denies the allegations contained in

paragraph 23 consistent with answers 9 through 22.
24.

Admits the allegations contained in paragraph 24.

25.

Admits and denies the allegations contained in

paragraph 25 consistent with answers 1 through 24.
26.

Denies the allegations contained in paragraph 26.

WHEREFORE, this defendant prays for judgment as follows:
1.

That plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed with preju-
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dice.
2.

That this defendant be awarded its costs, and any

other relief the Court deems appropriate*
COUNTERCLAIM
1.

That plaintiff is a resident of Davis County, Utah,

and does business under the name of Deseret Roofing Company.
2.

That this defendant is a Utah corporation lawfully

doing business in the State of Utah.
3.

That on or about April 13, 1983 the plaintiff and

defendant entered into a written contact, including plans and
specifications, under the terms of which plaintiff was to provide
materials and labor that would insure the construction of a
"water tite" roof.
4.

That roofing materials ordered and delivered under

the direction and control of the plaintiff were delivered to
defendants place of business for installation.
5.

That subsequent to the installation of the roofing

materials provided by the plaintiff the buildings were transported to the final construction site at Price, Carbon County,
Utah.

On or about June 8, 1983 a rain storm occurred at which

time the rain water penetrated the roofing material and into the
building, causing damage in the amount of approximately $50,000.
6.

That plaintiff's negligence was the direct and

proximate cause of the water damage suffered by the defendant.

-4KJ

7.

That the defendant has made demand upon the plain-

tiff for payment of said damages, but the plaintiff has refused
to pay, all to the damage of the defendant.
8.

That the written agreement between the plaintiff

and this defendant provides for attorney's fees in the event of
breach.

Defendant is entitled to receive reasonable attorney's

fees.
WHEREFORE, this defendant prays for judgment against the
plaintiff on its Counterclaim as follows:
1.

In the sum of $50,000, together with accrued

interest as determined by the Court.
2.

Attorney's fees as determined by the Court.

3.

Costs incurred herein, and any other relief deemed

appropriate by the Court.
Dated this 18th day of February, 1984.
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT

By

fp) ftff^
Henry SJ 'Nygaard
Attorneys for Defendant and
Counterclaimant, Interstate
Homes, Inc.

-5-
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STATE OP UTAH

)

County of Salt Lake

)

) SS:

ALICE ANDERSEN, being duly sworn, says:
That she is employed in the offices of Beaslin, Nygaard,
Coke & Vincent, attorneys for defendant Interstate Homes, Inc.
herein; that she served the attached Answer and Counterclaim of
Defendant Interstate Homes, Inc. upon the following named
individuals by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an
W. Cullen Battle, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Nick J. Colessides, Esq.
Attorney for Defendants Stangl
466 South 400 East Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and depositng the same, sealed, with first-class postage prepaid thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah,
on the 18th day of February, 1984.

QjJjL<JU

tf*vC(6M9^>

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 18th day of
February, 1984.

Notary Public
Residing at Salt Lake City, UT
My Commission Expires:
7/21/87

'•* a - t * V
t'.i
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Salt L«k« CoOhry, Ut»h

•

DEC 13 1984
H. Dixon Htndl#VrC2$dLJrd Dist^ Court

frvn..^rLI X ^ i
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
S T A ^ O F UTAH
BILL G. HENDRICKS, d/b/a
DESERET ROOFING COMPANY,

~~
ORDER AND SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
INTERSTATE HOMES INC., et al.,

Civil No. C-84-2993
(Judge Sawaya)

Defendants.

The Motion for Summary Judgment of plaintiff Bill G.
Hendricks having come for hearing before this Court on November
26, 1984, the Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding, the Court
having considered pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits on file, as well as
the memoranda and arguments of counsel, and having concluded that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that
plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
1.

That plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment be

granted and that plaintiff have and recover judgment from the
defendant Interstate Homes, Inc. the amount of $19,500 with
interest thereon at the rate of two percent per month from June
27, 1983 until the date of Judgment, and thereafter at the rate of
twelve percent per annum until paid.
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2.

That plaintiff have and recover judgment from

defendant interstate Homes, Inc. for his costs and attorney's fees
reasonably incurred herein, and that plaintiff shall submit a bill
for such costs and attorney's fees pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the local rules of this Court.
3.

That the Court directs entry of final judgment as to

plaintiff's claim herein and the Court expressly finds that there
is no just reason for delaying the entry of final judgment.
DATED this

> ^ d a y of December, 1984.
BY THE COUB*}:

he Honorable James S. Sawaya

ATTEST
*" H.DIXONMINDLSY
dent

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

•1

/

Ctork

W. Cullen Battle

S.]6ygaa
gaard

-2-
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2 0 1984
W. Cullen Battle, A0246
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Twelfth Floor
215 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-8900

S^X'-o.cv^QSJ..

~ZH

Robert A. Burton, #0516
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
BILL G. HENDRICKS, d/b/a
DESERET ROOFING COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
INTERSTATE HOMES, INC., FRANZ
C. STANGL III, ELIZABETH ANN
STANGL, NEBRASKA SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION, F.A., EMPIRE
LAND TITLE, INC., a Utah Corpation, and JOHN DOES I-XX,
Defendants.
BILL G. HENDRICKS d/b/a
DESERET ROOFING COMPANY,

J U D G M E N T
Civil No£C84-2 9 9 3 ^
Honorable James S. Sawaya

Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
OWENS-CORNING FIBERGLAS
CORPORATION,
Third-Party Defendant.

APPENDIX 3(b)

OWENS-CORNING FIBERGLAS
CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,

Civil No. C84-3471

vs.

(Consolidated with C84

BILL G. HENDRICKS d/b/a
DESERET ROOFING COMPANY and
F. C. STANGLE CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendants.

]
;
]

Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment seeking a dismissal
of the counterclaim filed by defendant Interstate Homes, Inc. came
on for hearing before the Honorable James S. Sawaya, one of the
judges of the above-entitled court, on November 26, 1984, at 2:00
P.M.

Plaintiff was represented by his attorneys Robert A. Burton

and W. Cullen Battle.

Defendant Interstate Homes,Inc. was

represented by its attorney, Henry Nygaard.

Third-Party Defendant

Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation was represented by its attorney,
Kent Shearer.

The court having reviewed the memoranda, affidavits

and file, heard arguments of counsel, being fully advised, and
having determined there are no genuine issues of material fact and
that plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and
with good cause appearing:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
(1)

The counterclaim of Interstate Homes, Inc. against

plaintiff Bill G. Hendricks d/b/a Deseret Roofing Company be and
hereby is dismissed with prejudice.
(2)

There is no just reason for delay and the entry of

final judgment is hereby directed.
(3)

Plaintiff Bill G. Hendricks d/b/a Deseret Roofing

131

Company is granted judgment on the counterclaim in his favor as
against defendant Interstate Homes, Inc., no cause of action.
Dated this

yC

day of December, 1984.
BY THE COURT: .

Approved as to form:

^

JUDGE

ATTEST
H. DIXON HINDLEY

1

Clefk

wry, , , ) » * ^
tfr..yN' i > V»

Henrty 'S.' Nygaard
Attorney for Plaintiff

-3-

Deputy Cl«rW

STATE OF UTAH

)
:
)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

ss.

PATSY WYATT, being duly sworn, says:
That she is employed in the offices of Strong & Hanni,
Attorneys for Plaintiff Bill G. Hendricks d/b/a Deseret-. Rnnfinrj r^
herein; that she served the attached

upon

Judcrment

all counsel

by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed
to:
Henry S. Nygaard
Attorney for Defendant Interstate Homes
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
W. Cullen Battle
Fabian & Clendenin
Twelfth Floor
215 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Kent Shearer
Shearer & Carling
Attorneys for Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.
1000 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid
thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, on
the

3rd

day of

December

> 19J-4 •

J Jo ft

LLML

S ubscribed and sworn to before me this
December

, 198 4 .

My commission expires:
5/13/85

"N

r\

3rd
\

day of
f

^^
^ •.
Notary
Public
Residing
at Salt
Lake City, Utah

PLO

r c<~r

"t . L

IAN 1 7 >3S')

/

-J

-f •->

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
STATE OF UTAH
BILL G. HENDIRCKS, d / b / a DESERET
jROOFING COMPANY,
!

SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT
AND AWARD OF COSTS AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. C-84-2993
(Judge Sawaya)

INTERSTATE HOMES, INC., et al.,
Defendants.

WHEREAS pursuant to the Order and Summary Judgment
entered herein on December 13, 1984, plaintiff was awarded his
costs and attorney's fees reasonably incurred herein, the amounts
of which to be submitted in a bill for costs and attorney's fees
pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and
WHEREAS on December 20, 1984, plaintiff filed with the
Court and served upon defendant a duly sworn and verified
'memorandum of costs in the amount of $495.75 and attorney's fees
i.

in the amount of $4,813.80, and

'

WHEREAS defendant has not within the time prescribed by

i

.Rule 54(d) filed with the Court any objection to plaintiff's
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney's Fees or motion to have such
l

,costs or fees taxed by this Court,
NOW, THEREFORE, for the reasons stated above and good
cause appearing therefor,
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Plaintiff is hereby awarded judgment for costs in the
amount of $495.74 and attorney's fees in the amount of $4,813.80
jand judgment is hereby entered against defendant Interstate Homes
for the same.
DATED this /*7

day of January, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

ATTEST

^)

r

H. DIXON HiNDLEY

^ _

-

/
•

> * 4 ^ * ^ * ^

Clafk

DISTRICT JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Supplemental Judgment and Award of Costs and
jAttorney's Fees, postage prepaid, this 14th day of January, 1985,
to the following:
Robert A. Burton, Esq.
Strong and Hanni
Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Henry S. Nygaard, Esq.
Beaslin, Nygaard, Coke & Vincent
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Kent Shearer, Esq.
Shearer & Carling
1000 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
/ / /

^

j

/
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HOTEL PROJECT - PRICE, OTAH

200 Morth S00 Nest
Bo. Salt Lake, Utah
OBSERET R00FI9G COMPART
3957 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
March 21, 1983
Customer Preparations As modules are built in customer's plant, the base
felt is to be nailed in place in accordance with Evans' specifications by
customer's personnel. Deseret Roofing Company (DRC) to furnish the felt
and nails in the amount they would normally use for area involved. . DRC is
not responsible for damage to the base felt at customer's plant, in transit
or during assembly of the modules in Price. Customer to furnish and
temporarily install pipe jacks.
Standard Pitch Roofs t DRC will furnish and install OC twenty (20) year
limited warranty fiberglass shingles in accordance with manufacturer's
specifications. Standard galvanised rake metal at gables. Color black,
red or gray. Valleys to be granulated cap sheet to match the shingles.
Low-Pitch Roofsi DRC will furnish and install a twenty (20) year
specification tar and gravel built-up roof to Evans Products Company's spec
G3-CP20-W. Surfacing to be red lava rock, slag or regular pea gravel.
Standard galvanized gravelstop at edges.
NARRABTYs Two (2) Year contactor's warranty on workmanship; twenty (20)
year OC warranty on shingles.
PRICES

<es3£2ES9t with s^ag surface or regular gravel.

4 xa> yme.oo
with fed lava rock surface.
TERMS: Cash upon completion. Interest 8 2% per month from date of invoice
will charged if not promptly paid.

DATES
EOTBs This bid is good until March 31, 1983.
scheduled.)

*T^i

(8% material increase

APPENDIX 4
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W. Cullen Battle, A0246
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
a Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Twelfth Floor
215 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-8900

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BILL G. HENDRICKS, d/b/a
DESERET ROOFING COMPANY,

AFFIDAVIT OF BILL G.
HENDRICKS IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST
DEFENDANT INTERSTATE HOMES,
INC.

Plaintiff,

v.
INTERSTATE HOMES, INC., et al. , j

Civil No. C-84-2993
(Judge Sawaya)

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
) ss.
)

BILL G. HENDRICKS deposes and says:
1.

That he is a resident of Davis County, Utah, over the

age of 21 years, and fully competent to make this affidavit.
2.

That he does business in Salt Lake County, Utah, as

Deseret Roofing Company.
3.

That on or about April 13, 1983, affiant and Inter-

state Homes entered into an agreement whereby affiant agreed to
furnish certain labor and materials necessary to roof a motel to be
built in Price, Utah.

Interstate Homes agreed to pay affiant the

sum of $19,500.00, together with interest thereon at 2% per month
LAW OFFICES

FABIAN & CLENDENIN
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
TWELFTH FLOOR 2 1 5 SOUTH STATE STREET
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from the date of invoice upon completion of the work.
4.

That as a part of that agreement affiant was to fur-

nish materials, hereinafter referred to as base felt, to Interstate
Homes at its factory.

It was agreed that the base felt was to be

installed by Interstate Homes' personnel in its factory and that
affiant was not to be involved in that phase of the installation of
the roof.
5.

That affiant ordered the base felt materials through

Owens-Corning.

The materials were billed to affiant but shipped

directly from Owens-Corning to Interstate Homes.
6.

That Interstate Homes requested that affiant furnish

an additional 18 rolls of base felt.
7.

That affiant ordered 18 rolls of base felt from

Owens-Corning.
8.

That affiant received a shipping order from Owens-

Corning that showed that 18 rolls of base felt had been shipped
directly to Interstate Homes.
9.

That on or around June 9, 1983, affiant learned from

Interstate Homes that the eighteen rolls that had been shipped
contained intermediate felt rather than base felt, that Interstate
Homes had applied the intermediate felt to certain modular units of
the motel and that as a result said units sustained water damage
during a rainstorm in Price, Utah.
10.

That affiant, prior to June 9, 1983, had no notice or

knowledge that 18 rolls of intermediate felt had been shipped to

LAW OFFICES

FABIAN & CLENDENIN
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
TWELFTH FLOOR 2 1 5 SOUTH STATE STREET
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 8 4 1 11 2 3 0 9
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Interstate Homes instead of 18 rolls of base felt.
11.

That affiant informed Interstate Homes that while he

did not believe that he was responsible for the water damage caused
by the use of the intermediate felt he would submit a claim to his
insurance carrier for the damage to the motel.
12.

That in return for submitting said insurance claim,

affiant demanded assurance from Interstate Homes that he would be
paid pursuant to the original agreement upon completion of the roof.
13.

That following said demand, affiant received from

Interstate Homes an inter-office memorandum, which stated in part
"that payment on this job will not be affected by insurance claims iii
progress."
14.

That in reliance upon the representations contained im

said memorandum affiant completed the roof.
15.

That upon completion of the work affiant sent an

invoice to Interstate Homes for the $19,500.00 as agreed.

That

invoice has not been paid by Interstate Homes.
16.

That on or about June 9, 1983, Interstate Homes

requested that affiant perform additional work necessitated by the
water damage to the motel.

Interstate Homes agreed to pay the

reasonable value of the work performed.
17.

That affiant performed the additional work requested

by Interstate Homes.
18.

That the reasonable value of the additional work is

19.

That affiant sent an invoice to Interstate Homes for

$2,852.14.
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the additional work requested by Interstate Homes.
20.

That as of the date of this affidavit Interstate

Homes has failed to pay for any of the work performed by affiant.
DATED this ^^\J^-sday of

CPe3^cA>*-^

/QjJu.

, 1984.

A./duduAA^

Bill G. Hendricks

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO b e f o r e me t h i s ' ^ & t j V t f a y o f
, 1984.

^ f~\ W-

NOTARY PUBLIC

Residing at

•

», • .

^cxQjj^. V/^^J^S^JK

My commission expires:
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TYPE G2
COATED CAP, OR BASE SHEET
FOR BUILT-UP ROOF COVERINGS
This product meets all mill manufacturing requirements
for No 1 material and complies with all applicable
requirements of UI-55A Standard Specification; the
Uniform Building Code Standard 32-1, A S T AA Standard Specification 0 2178-76 and Federal Specification
SS-R-620 6. Apply according to CVRHS PROOUCTS
COmP*nv
Published Specifications.

IMPORTANT
HANDLING AND APPLICATION INSTRUCTIONS
A. Store off the ground end protept front the weather.
B. Apply only to dry, clean, smooth turtaces.
C. Do not apply damp or wet materials.
0. Oo not apply wrinkled or cracked materials.
E. Weather conditions such as temperature, sun. wind, etc.,
must be given consideration. If the tempereture drops below
50°F., cracking, wrinkling, nonadheslon, and fish mouths
are more likely to occur.
F. Apply in hot asphalt as pert of an assembly in accordance
with evnns PRODUCTS I peRmjRGLRs
published specifications.
G. Do not lay on sides. Stend on ends only.
H. Do not store more than two pallets high.
evnns PRODUCTS
company
cennot be responsible for
results when the above precautions are not taken.

(32\€vnnsi

PGRITIRGLRS

POST OFFICE BOX E", CORVALLIS, OREGON 97339

Owens-Coming Supply Division

FlBERGlAS

Full Service Building Material Suppliers
To Meet Your Growing Needs.
*A Commercial i Residential Acoustical
Ceiling Products
•
f Building Insulation
V Faced Metal Building
Insulation Products
• Air Handling Products for
Residential k Commercial
Ventilating Bualnesses

• Energy Saving Products and
Accessories for the Building
Material Retailer and Builder
• Fabricated Insulation Products for
Original Equipment Manufacturer
• Commercial Roofing Products

r . T T T T T I i I ! I 1 OWENS-CORNINQ FIBERGLAS SUPPLY DIVISION
l i i h i ; »i n i
customer number
order date
promts* data
OM»i y q - j
P9P!4IfgM»
snip to:
invoice to:

\

DESERET ROOFING CO
. 3 9 5 7 - I Q U T H ttAIN-JTREEI
SALT LAKE CITY
UT 8 4 1 0 7
0 0 t ' 966 16S1
customer p«o. number
order placed by
COLLEEN

INTERSTATE HOHEI
50d-WEIT-2S# NORTH
SALT I AKE CITY
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Residential Roofing Products
Mobile Home Insulation Products
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Resins and Reinforcements for the
Flberalaa Reinforced Plastic
Manufacturer
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J) evnns / peRmaGLRS
PRODUCTS

company

TYPE IV
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ifactured

to meet or exceed the standards of ASTM D-217M6Type

IE SQUARE COVERS 100 SQUARE FEET OF ROOF ARE*

IMPORTANT
HANDLING AND APPLICATION INSTRUCTIONS
A. Store off the ground and protect from the weather.
B. Apply only to dry, clean, smooth surfaces.
C. Do not apply damp or wet materials.
D. Do not apply wrinkled or cracked materials.
E. Weather conditions such as tempgrfgure, sun, wind, etc.,
must be given consideration. If thefenfyeraturedrops below
50°F., crocking, wrinkling, ndha^hetflon. and fish mouths
are more likely to occur.
** -. - \ *
•,' '
*»
F. Apply in hot asphalt as part of ijp assembly In accordance
with evnns PRODUCT* %f>*Hmf*GL*s
published specifications. *
S^ ''
G. Do not lay on sides. StaniJ on ends only.
N. Do not store more than two pallets high.
evRns PRODUCTS company cannot be responsible for
results when the above precautions arp not taken.
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ROOFERS • PRICE MOTEL
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IQ^EZ

DESERET ( 2 6 6 - 1 6 0 1 ) THEY NEED TO F I N I S H LP A JOB
WILL BE ON PRICE JOB THl JRSDAY f, WfW Ti-FDUGH
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AGGRESS *

CONCERNING CJMMITME--.! V —
- . ^
.,..., . . . J ^ - ~u CHECr, u R Y - I N f
SHE STATED THAT THEY DID NCT h A ; E ANYONE TO SE"*;
I TOLD HER THAT
WE WOULD MONITOR THE DRY-IN AND I
* , r *' ' ' V
. - 5 ' S -RE INC JRRED
INSURANCE C L A I M .
WE W I L L A D D j o

W
MR. BILL HENDRICKS,
DFSERET ROOFING

: >

Copies
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